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2019年12月16日 16:37:29
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襄阳枣阳妇幼保健院中医院妇科评价襄阳第四人民医院医院男科在线Boom and bust in Asia亚洲的兴衰Going for growth谋求经济发展Explaining Asia’s economic success is as easy as one, two, three亚洲经济成功的秘诀用三点就足以概括Jul 13th 2013 |From the print editionHow Asia Works: Success and Failure in the World’s Most Dynamic Region. By Joe Studwell. Grove;《亚洲是如何运作的——论全球最具活力地区的成与败》,Joe Studwell 著。IN 1989 John Williamson, a British economist in Washington, DC, listed ten economic policies that enjoyed the backing of the IMF, the World Bank and many of their clients in Latin America. Whatever the merits of these policies, the “Washington consensus”, as he called it, proved badly named. Its prescriptions—stabilise, privatise and liberalise—have caused no end of controversy. Almost 25 years later, they get another drubbing in Joe Studwell’s provocative new book, “How Asia Works”.1989年,英国经济学家 John Williamson 在华盛顿提出了十条经济政策,受到了国际货币基金组织、世界以及拉丁美洲多国的持——这也就是他所谓的“华盛顿共识”。事实明,无论这些政策有何种优点,都远远算不上什么“共识”。“共识”指出要采取稳定化、私有化和自由化的措施,由此引发了无数争议。大约二十五年后的今天,Joe Studwell 推出了一本措辞激进的新书《亚洲是如何运作的》。在这本书里,Williamson 的这些经济政策又一次被批驳得体无完肤。But Mr Studwell’s own manifesto for economic success does resemble the Washington consensus in one respect: it holds that poor economies can prosper by following a short recipe of tried and tested policies. This is now an unfashionable approach among economists, who have turned their attention from policies to “institutions”: the social and political constraints that weigh on ministers, whatever policies they avow. Most authors shy away from prescriptions for success, arguing that every development dish is different.然而,就某方面而言,Studwell 本人对经济成功的阐述确实和“华盛顿共识”有几分相似之处:他认为贫穷经济体可以把某些经过尝试和考验的政策当作短期方针,以实现自身的繁荣。可经济学者们如今并不看好这种途径,已经把目光从政策转向了“体制”方面:因为无论政界高官持何种政策,社会和政治方面的约束总是会让他们裹足不前。很多作家都认为每个国家或地区的发展模式都是与众不同的,不愿意写书来阐述什么经济成功之道。Mr Studwell has no such inhibitions. Asia’s post-war miracle economies emerged, he argues, by following a recipe with just three ingredients: land reform; export-led, state-backed manufacturing; and financial repression.Studwell 却没有这种顾虑。他认为,有些亚洲经济体在战后奇迹般地崛起了,而它们成功的秘诀归根结底无非就是三点:一是土地改革;二是由出口带动、由国家持的制造业;三是金融抑制政策。The process began with the ousting of the landlords. Feudal estates were broken up and divided among small farmers, who also received cheap credit and valuable advice. Smallholder farming requires “grotesque” amounts of labour, Mr Studwell concedes. But that is a good thing, because countries as poor as Taiwan or South Korea were in the 1950s have labour—and only labour—in abundance.这些经济体的崛起是以地主退出历史舞台为起点的。封建式的私有地产被没收并分配给了小农户,同时他们还获得了低息贷款和宝贵的经验。Studwell 承认,小农型耕作需要“令人无法想象的”大量劳动力。但这不失为一件好事:因为在二十世纪五十年代,像台湾或是韩国这样贫穷的地区拥有大批劳动力——除此之外也没有别的了。Tightly planted, closely tended farms coax the best yields out of each parcel of land. This rural bounty then creates room for the next step: export-led manufacturing. The state, Mr Studwell argues, must nurse manufacturers through their infancy, helping them to learn how to stand on their own feet. This nurture should, however, be combined with discipline: the state must oblige firms to export. Foreign sales provide an external test of their progress, allowing the state to “cull losers”, even if it cannot pick winners.在这些地区,农场上种满了密密麻麻的作物,又受到了仔细的照料,每一块地都有很不错的产量。而后,这种农业上的富庶为亚洲繁荣的下一步(也就是由出口带动的制造业)创造了空间。Studwell 认为,国家必须在制造业者尚且处于“婴幼儿期”时为它们提供充分的呵护,让它们学会如何去依靠自身力量实现发展。然而,在呵护的同时还需要进行约束:国家必须强制要求这些公司进行出口。对外销量为制造业者的发展提供了一种外在的衡量尺度,让国家得以“淘汰弱者”——即便是在无法挑选出强者的情况下。The final secret of Asian success, Mr Studwell argues, was a cowed financial system. Captive savers, penned in by capital controls, were ripped off by the banks, which paid low interest rates. This allowed the banks to subsidise industrial firms through their years of education.Studwell 认为,亚洲成功的最后一条秘诀就是那种受到国家钳制的金融体系。提供的存款利率很低,但储户被资本管制所束缚,除了接受的讹诈之外别无选择。这笔资金让得以为产业公司提供了数年的“教育经费”。Mr Studwell’s recipe is not original: the formula dates back at least 140 years, he shows, to Japan under the Meiji emperor. Only the first step, smallholder farming, would be backed by this newspaper. But “How Asia Works” is a striking and enlightening book, which reflects the author’s unusual career. Having worked as an analyst (for the Economist Intelligence , our sister company) and a consultant, he wrote books on China’s seduction of foreign businessmen and Asia’s crony capitalists. Then he went back to school, embarking on a doctorate at Cambridge, home to a number of unorthodox economists.Studwell 的秘方并非独开先河。他表示这些成功秘诀至少可以追溯到一百四十年前明治天皇统治下的日本。而本报只对其中的第一步(也就是小农耕作)持持态度。不过,《亚洲是如何运作的》这本书确实富于启迪性,让人耳目一新。它折射了作者不寻常的职业生涯。Studwell 曾经在本报的姊公司经济学人信息部担任过分析人士,也曾经从事过咨询工作。他写过几本书,论述过中国对外商的吸引力、以及亚洲的裙带资本家等等。而后他回到校园攻读士学位,进的正是剑桥大学——这里有很多不拘传统的经济学家。The result is a lively mix of scholarship, reporting and polemic. Its heart is a historical account of how smallholder farming, export-led manufacturing and financial repression took root in Asia’s miracle economies, such as Japan and Taiwan, but failed to bed down in the Philippines and Indonesia. This is punctuated by travelogues, describing Asia’s landscape of economic triumph and tribulation, from the kitsch houses of rice farmers in Japan’s Niigata prefecture, who have great agricultural know-how but little architectural taste, to the unfinished towers of Jakarta’s Bank Alley, their growth stunted by the Asian financial crisis.最终,Studwell 把学术研究、调查报道以及书面论战生动地糅为一体。在一些创造奇迹的亚洲经济体中(比如日本和台湾),小农耕作、由出口带动的制造业以及金融抑制政策是如何植根的?在菲律宾和印度尼西亚,同样的措施又为何没有形成气候?本书重点从历史角度论述了这些问题。书中还穿插了一些游记见闻,描述了亚洲大地上经济繁荣或是衰颓的景象:Studwell 写到了日本新泻县稻农的简陋住所——这些农民有高超的农业技术,却不懂什么建筑美学;也写到了雅加达岸巷里尚未建成的塔楼——由于亚洲金融危机,这些塔楼迟迟未能完工。The most impressive part of the book is the 68 pages of footnotes in which Mr Studwell dips into his trove of ing and reporting. He includes observations on Javanese chickens, the sex life of a Korean chaebol-founder, the constitutional rules that Meiji-era Japan copied from Prussia and his exchanges with Mahathir Mohamad, Malaysia’s former strongman.本书让人印象最为深刻的部分就是长达68页的脚注。Studwell 读过很多书,也进行过大量报道,在脚注里他粗略提及了一些。他谈到了爪哇人饲养的鸡,谈到了韩国某个财团创始人的性生活,谈到了明治时代日本模仿普鲁士设立的宪章,还谈到了他和马来西亚前铁腕领导人马哈蒂尔#8226;穆罕默德之间的对话。In these notes, Mr Studwell wanders into the weeds of development (quite literally: Japanese rice is weeded nine times a year, he writes). But he never gets lost. The three-step doctrine he advocates is even shorter than the ten-step Washington consensus he opposes. But it will no doubt prove similarly controversial.在这些脚注中,Studwell 偶尔会提到一些阻碍经济发展的“杂草”(从字面意义上来说,他写到日本的水稻一年需要进行九次除草)。但Studwell 从未偏离主题。相比他所反对的“十步走”式华盛顿共识,他本人提倡的“三步走”主义甚至更为简略。但毫无疑问,二者都将会充满争议。 /201307/248112襄阳第一人民医院中药科

襄阳那家医院治疗早泄比较好襄阳第四人民医院医院生殖男科医生上班表Finance and Economics;Walter Schloss; Death of a non-salesman;财经;沃尔特·施洛斯;他不是一个推销员;The passing of a truly contrarian investor;一位真正的逆向投资者离世;Walter Schloss was never a face on financial television programmes. Nor was he known for marketing his skills to investors (he was indifferent to collecting clients and only 92 managed to sign on). His death last month, at the age of 95, garnered little public comment but among a certain crowd it meant the loss of a mind that was courageous, independent and utterly distinct from much of modern finance.沃尔特·施洛斯既不是财经类电视节目中常常出现的名人,也不是靠教授投资技巧而出名(他并不关心有多少顾客,所以只有92人真正和他签约)。他与上个月去世,享年95岁,他的死并没引起公众注意,但是在特定的领域里,他的死意味着一种勇敢、独立、与现代金融学的很多东西完全不同的一种思想的流逝。Mr Schloss was part of a small group who worked with Benjamin Graham, a Columbia Business School professor whose most famous disciple is Warren Buffett. Mr Schloss did not spend time tailing corporate managers. His research team doubled in size when his son joined. He favoured discarded “cigar butt” stocks that could be swept off the floor. Often, they werent worth much but they sold for far less.施洛斯先生是少数曾经和本杰明·格雷厄姆共事的人之一。格雷厄姆是哥伦比亚商学院教授,他最有名的一个学徒名叫沃伦·巴菲特。施洛斯没有花时间去纠缠公司的经理们。在他的儿子加入后,他的研究组扩大了一倍。他偏爱被遗弃的满地都是的“雪茄屁股”股票。它们通常不值多少钱,但是价格远低于其他股票。As for high-flying shares, he was not afraid to go short. During the late 1990s, when a “new era” caused many people to throw out any normal valuation measures as hopelessly obsolete, Mr Schloss stayed firm and bet against some of the most popular and inflated names.对于高价股票,他从不担心会卖空。20世纪90年代末,当一个“新的纪元”使许多人把所有正常的评估措施当做过时的废品扔掉时,施洛斯仍坚定不移,并打赌,某些热门的、价格飞涨的品种也有下跌的时候。In part, he could do so because of a famously frugal cost structure. In part, he was protected by an extraordinary long-term record. When he ceased managing money for outsiders, his returns were reported to have averaged 16% annually, six percentage points higher than the market. He had other tactics, too. In 1999, when his portfolio was composed of everything no one wanted, he was asked how, even if his own convictions were unshaken, he could ensure that his investors stuck with him. Being a true contrarian required just one rule, he said: “Never tell a client what they own.”他这样做一方面依据的是著名的节约成本结构。另一方面则是那段非同寻常的长时期记录帮助了他。据报道称,停止为一些门外汉理财后,他的收益已经达到了年均16%,比市场回报率高出六个百分点。除此之外,他还有另外一些策略。1999年,他的券投资组合中全是没人要的股票,有人问他,即使拥有坚定信念,他是如何确保投资者对他的持。他说道,作为一个真正的逆向投资者只要具备一条:“不要告诉自己的客户他们拥有什么样的股票。” /201307/247122Afghanistans election阿富汗选举A useful crisis有效的转折A fudge between two feuding presidential candidates may offer a political road map两个长期不和的总统候选人相互挤兑,这或许能提供一个政治路线图HOLDING a presidential election in Afghanistan only months before the withdrawal of Western combat forces was bound to be risky—even before one of the candidates, Abdullah Abdullah, reacted to preliminary results showing a suspiciously big lead for his opponent, Ashraf Ghani, by alleging “industrial-scale” fraud. The political crisis could have plunged the country into chaos and even war.于西方作战部队撤离前几个月在阿富汗举行总统选举注定是充满风险的。候选人之一的阿卜杜拉断言,对手阿什拉夫的持率远远领先于他是可疑的,是“工业”欺诈。这场政治危机可能会使该国经济陷入混乱甚至战争。Yet this dangerous moment could turn out to be oddly productive. Disaster has been averted thanks to the banging-together of heads by Americas secretary of state, John Kerry, and to the good sense of the presidential candidates, who stared into the abyss and retreated. Their deal points towards a political structure that should work better than the current one.然而,这一危险时刻可能会出奇地有效。由于美国国务卿约翰·克里的群策群力和陷入深渊和撤退时总统候选人们的理智,灾难得以避免。他们的策略指向更有效工作的政治结构。Come on, its Afghanistan来吧,这就是阿富汗In the first round of the election to replace Hamid Karzai as president, nearly 7m Afghans turned out to vote. But in the second, Dr Abdullah made no gain at all from the 45% of the vote he had secured in a crowded field; meanwhile, the share of his rival, Mr Ghani, leapt from 31% to 56%. Suspiciously, turnout increased by more than 1m votes. Mr Ghani has the backing of Mr Karzai, who stole the election from Dr Abdullah in . This time Dr Abdullahs backers threatened to establish a breakaway government. That might lead to civil war.在第一轮选举中,近700万阿富汗人持替换哈米德·卡尔扎伊总统。但在第二轮中,阿卜杜拉并没有在他有把握的45%领域中获得选票,与此同时,他的竞争对手阿什拉夫的持率从31%上升到56%。可疑的是,选票增加了100多万。卡尔扎伊是持阿什拉夫的,他在年的选举中从阿卜杜拉手中窃取了选举的胜利。这一次阿卜杜拉的持者们扬言要建立独立政府,这可能导致内战。Barack Obama called Dr Abdullah and threatened to stop all American military and financial aid. Dr Abdullah backed down. In return, America has promised a full, internationally supervised audit of every vote cast. The inauguration of a new president has been postponed from August 2nd to the end of the month. In truth it is not at all clear how much fraud an audit will pick up. But both candidates have promised to accept the result, and that matters more than the actual tally.巴拉克?奥巴马同阿卜杜拉联系,威胁称美国将停止所有军事和经济援助。阿卜杜拉做退缩了。作为回报,美国已承诺对投票过程进行完全的国际监督审查。新总统的就职典礼已从8月2日推迟到这个月底,事实上,还不清楚在审查过程中会发现多少舞弊行为。但两位候选人都承诺接受结果,这比实际数字更重要。As well as being a short-term fix, the deal holds out the promise of a solution to the structural problems of Afghanistans politics. Too much power resides in the office of the president. In 2004, when the constitution was ratified, extreme centralisation—for example, all provincial governors and police chiefs are appointed by the president—seemed the best way to hold the country together. Now it is pulling it apart. Political loyalties and social ties require local expression. But Mr Karzais ability to bypass institutions by forming his own network of patronage has stunted the development of Afghan democracy and done nothing to cut corruption. A bizarre voting system, crying out for reform, has prevented the formation of real political parties and resulted in a weak and fractious legislature.作为一个短期的解决方案,该协议同时提供了解决阿富汗政治结构性问题的方法。总统办公室拥有太多的权力。2004年宪法生效时,极度的中央集权—例如所有省长和警察局长由总统任命—似乎是将整个国家团结在一起的最好方式。现在,中央集权却使国家分裂了。政治忠诚和社会关系需要地域表达。但卡尔扎伊绕过机构形成自己的资助网络,阻碍阿富汗民主的发展并且未能削弱腐败。一个奇怪的迫切需要改革的投票系统,阻碍了真正的政党形成,并形成了脆弱又难以控制的立法机构。Under the deal brokered by Mr Kerry, there will be a government of national unity. The election-winner will be president, but the loser (or his nominee) will be “chief of the executive council”, a new position implying power-sharing. Then, after two years, there will be a loya jirga (a gathering of tribal elders, local power-brokers and elected officials) to approve constitutional changes that include the creation of the post of prime minister. He would rank below the president but have executive powers.根据克里的谈判交易,将会成立一个民族团结的政府。选举获胜者将成为总统,但失败者(或其指定人)将作为执行委员会的主席,,新职位意味着分权。两年之后,将会有一个尔格大会(部落长老们、地方政治掮客和民选官员们的聚会)来批准修改宪法,包括建立总理一职,该头衔低于总统但有行政权力。Such a structure would better reflect the reality of a country that is ethnically diverse, corrupt, Byzantine and more comfortable with give and take than a winner-takes-all politics. It might also offer a route out of violence for those Taliban who are not implacable ideologues but feel shut out by the present system. If Afghanistans leaders can make it work, they will be doing their country a huge service.这样的结构可以更好地反映一个国家的现状—多民族的、腐败的、拜占庭式的、更适合平等交换而不是赢者通吃的政治。它还可能给那些觉得被现有制度拒之门外的塔利班们一条远离暴力的道路。如果阿富汗领导人能使之生效,它们将会为这个国家做出巨大贡献。As so often happens in Afghanistan, everything could still go suddenly wrong. But Mr Kerry has helped ensure that a good crisis has not gone to waste.这种事情在阿富汗时有发生,一切都仍有可能突然失败。但克里确保了这个良好的转折点还没有被浪费。 /201407/314008襄阳南漳县妇幼保健院中医院做宫腔镜的医生Syria’s war叙利亚战争Their own men自己人Islamist rebels sever ties with the political opposition伊斯兰反对派与政治反对派断绝关系Sep 28th 2013 | CAIRO AND ISTANBUL |From the print editionSYRIA’S exiled opposition has long struggled to influence the course of the civil war. Its ambitions may just have been dashed for good by those who do the actual fighting. On September 24th eleven of Syria’s strongest rebel brigades jointly announced their rejection of the Syrian Opposition Coalition (SOC), the quarrelsome but broadly moderate Istanbul-based dissident leadership that is recognised by Western and Gulf governments. Syrians outside the country and those picked by foreigners have no authority, said a rebel spokesman. Moreover, he declared, Syria’s revolution must be pursued “within a clear Islamic framework”, based on sharia law as the sole source of legislation.叙利亚流亡的政治反对派一直在努力影响内战的进程。他们的野心可能会被真正参战的反对派所打破。9月24日,叙利亚最强的十一个反叛旅共同宣布他们反对叙利亚反对派联盟(SOC),SOC是西方和海湾各国政府公认的设在伊斯坦布尔的领导,虽然会有争吵,但是相对还是比较温和。一个反对派发言人说,身在国外的叙利亚人和外国人挑选的叙利亚人没有权威。此外,他宣布,叙利亚革命必须奉行“在一个明确的伊斯兰框架之内”,什叶派教法作为立法的唯一来源。New associations come and go in Syria, but this one includes the most powerful and active front-line forces, ranging from moderate Islamists like Liwa al-Tawheed, which previously pledged allegiance to the coalition’s military wing, the Supreme Military Command, to jihadist groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra, an al-Qaeda affiliate. The decision by groups such as Tawheed to partner with radical Islamists guts the military command, leaving it with few groups it can claim to control.叙利亚新旧协会来来去去,但是SOC包含最强大最活跃的一线部队,包括温和派伊斯兰主义者Liwa al-Tawheed,其曾承诺效忠联盟的军事势力最高军事指挥以及诸如基地组织联盟成员,圣战组织Jabhat al-Nusra。诸如Tawheed等组织与激进伊斯兰主义者合作的决定破坏了军事命令,使得很少组织受控于SOC。Islamist fighters of varying hues have grown to dominate Syria’s mosaic of rebel groups. Outside support for jihadists, which comes mostly from private donors and networks in the Gulf, has proven more reliable than the stop-start flow that foreign governments direct to milder-mannered, Western-approved rivals. Even some vetted fighters have long espoused the creation of an Islamic state, but quietly so as not to worry non-Islamist brothers-in-arms—let alone Syria’s myriad non-Sunni Muslim minorities. The decision to go public is in part down to Egypt, says one rebel man. The coup that ousted Muhammad Morsi, a Muslim Brother, showed that there is nothing to gain from paying lip service to democracy.各种色的伊斯兰武装分子已经成长为主导叙利亚的反叛联盟。外界对圣战者的持大多来自私人捐助以及海湾地区的网络,而西方政府则直接向他们认可的对手,温和的派别断断续续的持,前者被明更可靠。甚至一些审查的武装分子都希望建立一个伊斯兰国家,但是都是悄悄地说,以免引起非伊斯兰教兄弟联盟,更不要说叙利亚无数的非逊尼派穆斯林少数民族。一个反对派成员表示,作出公开决定的部分原因是埃及。埃及的争辩推翻了穆兄会的穆罕默德穆尔西,表明嘴皮子民主没什么用。Western powers will now find their proxies have less influence than ever. In the month since America backed away from missile strikes to punish Syria’s regime for using chemical weapons, the SOC has become increasingly irrelevant. Strikes would have bolstered moderates, including Selim Idriss, a defected general who heads the military command. The ensuing deal between Russia and America whereby Syria’s regime must hand over its chemical weapons was perceived as coming at the expense of the rebels.现在,西方势力他们的代理影响力变得前所未有的微弱。自从美国决定放弃导弹袭击惩罚叙利亚政府使用化学武器以来的一个月,SOC已经变得越来越无关紧要。袭击将会增强温和派的实力,包括负责军事指挥的叛逃将军Selim Idriss。随后美俄之间关于叙利亚政府必须交出其化学武器的协议被发现是由反对派买单。The opposition schism renders the prospect of a negotiated end to the conflict in the near future flimsier still. But the new joint fighting force could act as a bulwark against the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), an al-Qaeda group manned largely by foreign mujahideen that is more radical than Jabhat al-Nusra. ISIS did not sign the statement, and has faced growing hostility as it seeks to expand its influence.反对分类使得不久将来通过协商解决冲突的前景变得渺茫。但是新的联合作战部队可以作为反抗伊拉克伊斯兰国和沙姆地区组织(ISIS)的堡垒,ISIS是一个很大程度上由比Jabhat al-Nusra更激进的外国基地组织mujahideen所操纵的组织。ISIS没有签署声明,随着其对外扩张会面对更多的敌意。201310/260349老河口妇幼保健院中医院地址

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