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2019年09月17日 19:08:17

武汉市人民医院看泌尿科怎么样Why are the high-income countries not mired in deflation? This is the puzzle today, not the absence of the hyperinflation that hysterics have wrongly expected. It is weird that inflation has remained so stable, despite huge shortfalls in output, relative to pre-crisis trends, and prolonged high unemployment. Understanding why this is the case is important because the answer determines the correct policy action. Fortunately, the news is good. The stability of inflation seems to be a reward for the credibility of inflation targeting. That gives policy makers room to risk expansionary policies. Ironically, the success of inflation targeting has revitalised Keynesian macroeconomic stabilisation. A chapter in the latest World Economic Outlook from the International Monetary Fund presents the case for this encouraging conclusion, as has aly been noted by, among others, Gavyn Davies and Paul Krugman. Its starting point is with the stickiness of inflation, despite the lengthy period of very high joblessness. Thus, states the IMF, “we find a dog that did not bark”. A possible explanation for this phenomenon is structural. It is argued by many, for example, that the workers who lost their jobs in construction and other bubble-era activities have the wrong skills or are located in the wrong places to take up the new jobs that might now – or soon – be on offer. Again, if unemployment is allowed to remain high for long, what starts as temporary joblessness is likely to become permanent, as workers lose the skills and networks that make it relatively easy to find jobs. So the duration of the Great Recession has put long-term joblessness near record levels. All this tends to make competition in labour markets weak. An alternative explanation is more encouraging. It is that inflation targeting has anchored expectations and so labour market behaviour. Moreover, these targets are close to zero. We know that workers are resistant to cuts in nominal wages. This has remained true throughout the Great Recession: it is indeed one of the reasons why the adjustment in the eurozone is so painful. So, for this reason too, inflation would be sticky, at least downwards. The chapter’s preliminary analysis of these alternatives reaches three main conclusions. The first is that “expectations are strongly anchored to the central banks’ inflation targets rather than being particularly affected by current inflation levels”. Second, the anchoring of expected inflation has increased over time, while the impact of current inflation on expected inflation has diminished. Finally, the relationship between inflation and current unemployment has correspondingly diminished. It became nearly non-existent after 1995, which saw a long period of stable inflation in line with the inflation targets of central banks. The detailed econometric work supports this preliminary analysis, but adds two further points. The most important is that there is substantial cyclical unemployment, at present. A less important one is that the impact of global inflation on inflation in individual countries has not shown any clear trend. An analysis of the US reveals the import of these changes: if the relationship between the cycle and inflation were now as it was in the 1970s, the US price level would aly be falling. Fortunately, that has not been the case: otherwise, real rates of interest would now be strongly positive and balance-sheet deflation far more threatening to US stability than it has been. Encouragingly, experience during the period of economic boom, before the financial crisis, suggests the stickiness of inflation does not only work in one direction. Inflation remained in line with targets then, too. This was notably true in Spain and the UK. (See charts.) A final interesting conclusion emerges from the contrast between the performance of the US and Germany in the 1970s, which was when the Bundesbank cemented its reputation. It did not achieve this success because it never made mistakes, but because people believed it would do what was necessary to hit the target. Inflation targeting could indeed be flexible, provided it remained credible. This is important analytical work with big implications for policy. First, mistakes in estimating the degree of economic slack, which are inevitable, may not matter that much, provided people remain sure that the central banks are committed to their targets. This is one of the big benefits of a flat “Phillips curve” (the relationship between cyclical unemployment and inflation). Second, given the uncertainty about the degree of slack and the failure of inflation to respond to huge recessions, it is imperative that central banks not limit their aims to hitting their inflation targets. On the contrary, their job in a deep recession and, in some countries, alas, a worsening one, is to aim for the highest levels of activity consistent with stable inflation. Past success gives them not only the opportunity, but the obligation, to risk expansion of demand in contractionary times. Those running the European Central Bank, please note: low inflation is not enough. Third, while central banks should retain inflation targets at the core of their objectives, experience has also demonstrated that this is not enough. The idea that it is easier to clean up after a financial mess than limit a credit bubble has proved wrong. The only question is how to act. It is clearly important to build a more resilient financial system, through higher capital standards and aggressive macroprudential policies. None of this is going to be easy. A chapter in the companion Global Financial Stability Report brings out, for example, the potential drawbacks of the unconventional policies that central banks were driven to use once interest rates became close to zero. While changing inflation targets would be extremely risky, what has happened suggests that somewhat higher inflation might have been helpful. Experience certainly indicates that monetary policy is not all that effective, on its own, during a balance-sheet recession. It must be complemented by fast reconstruction of the financial system, accelerated private sector deleveraging and a willingness to employ the fiscal balance sheet to support demand, wherever feasible. Yet, for all the complacency of the pre-crisis period, it is good to know that its one clear success – that of cementing inflation expectations – has given policy makers needed policy flexibility. They must use it. 为什么高收入国家没有陷入通货紧缩的泥潭?这才是今天的待解之谜,而不是为什么恶性通货膨胀没有出现——一些歇斯底里的人曾错误地预测会出现恶性通胀。奇怪的是,尽管相对于危机之前的趋势水平,经济产出已大幅下降,失业率也长期居高不下,通胀却一直保持稳定。理解为什么会出现这种情况非常重要,因为决定了能否采取正确的政策行动。幸运的是,我们有好消息。稳定的通胀似乎是对通胀目标可信度的一种嘉奖。于是政策制定者就有了采取扩张性政策的冒险空间。具有讽刺意味的是,通胀目标的成功赋予了凯恩斯主义宏观经济稳定政策新的活力。 国际货币基金组织(IMF)最新发布的《世界经济展望》(World Economic Outlook)的一个章节就分析了这个鼓舞人心的结论,加文#8226;戴维斯(Gavyn Davies)和保罗#8226;克鲁格曼(Paul Krugman)也都指出过这点。其出发点就是,尽管高失业率长期持续,但通胀具有粘性。因此,IMF指出,“我们找到了一条不叫的。” 这个现象可以从结构的角度来解释。比如说,很多人都认为,建筑行业或者其他泡沫行业的失业工人,由于缺乏合适的技能或者身在错误的地方,而无法从事现在或者不远的将来可能出现的新工作。同样,如果放任失业率长期居高不下,最初的临时失业则可能会转变为永久失业,原因是工人会失去技能和关系网,使得找工作相对较难。因此,“大衰退”(Great Recession)的持续已经使得长期失业逼近破纪录的水平。所有这些都可能会使劳动力市场的竞争弱化。 另外一个解释更鼓舞人心:通胀目标使人们的预期固定下来,也稳定了劳动力市场的表现。此外,这些通胀目标都接近于零。我们知道,工人们反感名义工资的降低,整个“大衰退”期间都是如此:这也是欧元区调整如此痛苦的原因之一。因此,也正是因为这个原因,通胀将具有粘性,至少是向下的粘性。 该章节初步分析了这些可能的解释之后,得出了三个主要结论。第一,“央行的通胀目标对预期有很强的锚定作用,而当前的通胀水平对预期没有特别大的影响。”第二,通胀目标对通胀预期的锚定作用随着时间的推移越来越大,而当前通胀率对通胀预期的影响逐渐减小。最后,通胀率和当前失业率之间的联系也相应减小。1995年之后,这种联系基本上已经不存在,而同时,通胀与央行通胀目标之间长期保持稳定的一致。 更为细致的计量经济学研究工作持这一初步的分析,但补充了两点。较为重要的一点是,当前存在明显的周期性失业。次要的一点是,全球通胀对各国通胀的影响还没有任何明显的趋势。 对美国的分析揭示了这些变化的重要性:如果现在的周期和通胀之间的关系与上世纪70年代类似,那么美国的物价应该已经下降。幸运的是,事实并不是这样:否则的话,实际利率就会远高于零,资产负债表收缩对美国稳定性的威胁也会远大于现在。令人鼓舞的是,金融危机之前的经济繁荣期间的经验表明,通胀的粘性不仅是朝着一个方向。那个时候通胀率与通胀目标也是一致的。这点在西班牙和英国表现尤为明显。(见图表。) 最后一个有趣的结论是通过对上世纪70年代美国和德国的对比得出的,正是在那个时候德国央行(Bundesbank)确立了声望。它不是因为从不犯错而获得这种成功,而是因为人们相信它会采取必要措施来实现目标。只要保持可信度,通胀目标就可以是灵活变动的。 这是重要的分析工作,对政策有着重要意义。 首先,评估经济放缓程度时即使犯错(这是不可避免的),可能也没那么要紧,只要人们依然确信央行致力于实现制定的目标。这是平坦的菲利普斯曲线(Phillips curve,描述周期性失业和通胀之间的关系)的较大优势之一。 第二,鉴于经济放缓程度的不确定性和通胀应对严重衰退的失败,央行必须不将目标局限于实现通胀目标。与此相反,当经济深陷衰退时,或者在某些国家,当经济衰退加剧时,它们有责任以实现与稳定的通胀水平相一致的最高经济活动水平为目标。过去的成功不仅赋予了它们这种机会,也赋予了它们一种职责,在收缩时期试着扩大需求。欧洲央行(ECB)的管理者们请注意:低通胀是不够的。 第三,尽管央行需要将维持通胀目标作为核心目标之一,经验也表明这是不够的。在金融动荡之后“收拾摊子”比抑制信贷泡沫要容易的观点,已被明是错误的。唯一的问题在于如何行动。通过更高的资本标准和进取性的宏观审慎政策,建立一个更强韧的金融体系,显然非常重要。 所有这些都不会很容易。比如,IMF同时发布的《全球金融稳定报告》(Global Financial Stability Report)中的一章,就指出了在利率接近于零的时候,央行倾向于使用的非传统政策的潜在缺陷。改变通胀目标确实非常危险,但事实表明较高的通胀或许是有益的。经验明,在资产负债表衰退期间,单单货币政策并不会产生多大效果,必须得到如下方面的补充:金融体系快速重组,私营领域加速去杠杆化,政府有意愿在任何可行的领域通过动用财政资产负债表手段来持需求。 另外,尽管危机前的繁荣导致了人们的自满,它却有一个明显的成功之处是我们需要知道的——它强化了人们的通胀预期,这给政策制定者提供了必要的政策灵活性。他们必须用好这种灵活性。武汉鸡巴肿了用什么水肤BAD ADVICE: EAT A VARIETY OF FOODS!   Why you should skip it: We’re hardwired to eat more when faced with countless different choices. This trait gives us an advantage when a sp consists of low-cal, filling fare such as veggies and lean protein. But your kitchen is most likely stocked with a variety of healthy and not-sohealthy edibles.   How to smarten up:   Keeping special treats in the house is fine, but try to limit your stash to one or two of your favorites. The lion’s share should be for a range of nutritious foods, such as veggies, fruit and whole grains.   错误的建议:摄取多种多样的食物! 为什么不可取:当我们面前有数不清的各种食物选择时,我们一定会吃得更多。当一顿盛宴中都是蔬菜和精益蛋白质等低卡路里且易饱的食物时,这种理论对我们减肥有益。但你的厨房十有八九同时堆满了各种健康和不那么健康的食物。   如何改进:   在家里储备一些好吃的食物当然很好,但要尽量控制你储备的食物中只有一两种你喜欢吃的东西。储备最多的应该是各种有营养的食物,比如蔬菜、水果和全麦食品。 /201002/96021武汉华夏医院男性检查

武汉睾丸有时硬有时软咸宁市中心医院不孕不育多少钱Since 1980 China has had a one-child policy. The result is that traditionally large families have turned into 1)inverted pyramids with multiple grandparents for every treasured little one, a child on whom much attention is 2)lavished and of whom great things are expected.自1980年起,中国实行独生子女政策。其结果是传统的大家庭变成了倒置的金字塔,在这个金字塔里,每一个宝贝小孩子都有几个祖辈老人,过多的注意力都集中在一个小孩身上,同时,很多期望也寄托在一个小孩身上。This is the Long Yun Guzheng Training Academy. It#39;s a private music school where girls learn to play the Guzheng. The school is run by Ms. Long, herself a fine 3)soloist, who has even toured in the U.S. I asked her how many of the students are only children.这里是成都的龙韵古筝艺术培训中心。这是一家教女孩子学习弹奏古筝的私立音乐培训机构。这个培训中心是由龙德君女士开办的,龙女士本身就是一名优秀的古筝演奏家,她还曾经在美国作巡回演出。我问她,学琴的学生当中有多少是独生子女。Long Dejun: (via translator) All of the students in this school are only children. We have 300 students, a little over 300.龙德君:(通过翻译)这里全部的学生都是独生子女。我们有三百名学生,三百略多一点。Ms. Long says the pressure that only children can feel might be too much for some students, but it might actually make others work harder.龙女士说独生子女受到的压力对于一些学生来说可能难以承受,但也可能使另外一些学生更加刻苦用功。In this practice room, three girls age six, six and a half, and ten play in 4)unison with a 5)metronome keeping time. Each is perched on her three-legged stool in front of her instrument. The six-and-a-half-year-old in the front chair is so little her feet don#39;t reach the ground. As the children take their lessons, the parents or grandparents who brought them wait. A few told us their kids practice at least an hour a day. I asked Ye Ping about the phenomenon of so many only children. She#39;s an accountant who is waiting for her 10-year-old daughter. She said, yes, these kids live under a great deal of pressure.在这个琴房里,三个女孩子的年龄分别是六岁、六岁半和十岁,她们在节拍器的帮助下练习合奏。每个女孩子都坐在琴前的三脚凳上。那个六岁半的小女孩儿身体太矮小了,她的脚都够不着地。而在孩子们练琴的时候,把她们送来的父母或者家里的老人则在一旁等候。有几个人告诉我们,他们的孩子一天至少要练一个小时的琴。我向叶萍(音译)问起她对独生子女现象的看法。她是一名会计师,正在等她十岁的女儿。她说,是的,这些孩子都在巨大的压力下生活。Ye Ping: (via translator) Children here don#39;t have a very happy childhood.叶萍:(通过翻译)这里的孩子没有一个开心的童年。Reporter: What would be a better word to describe their childhood?记者:你觉得什么词描述他们的童年会更合适?Ye Ping: (via translator) Hard work.叶萍:(通过翻译)辛苦。Song Daode is a 66-year-old retiree who happily admits to 6)doting full time on his 12-year-old granddaughter. She#39;s his only grandchild. He says many more people now can provide their kids with a good education and they feel that they have to so that their children can compete.宋道德(音译)是一名六十六岁的退休人员,他很乐意承认自己把全部时间都花在他十二岁的孙女身上,她也是他惟一的孙辈。他说,现在有更多的人有条件让自己的孩子接受良好的教育,他们觉得如果想让自己的孩子将来能与他人竞争,就必须这么做。Song Daode: (via translator) The big difference between China and other countries is that there are so many of us, so the pressures on the children are so much greater. I#39;ve been to Singapore and they don#39;t have as many people. Pressure on their students is not as great as here. In China, the pressure to study is great. So we parents and grandparents are all running around in circles for our kids.宋道德:(通过翻译)中国与其他国家的一个很大的不同点就是中国人太多了,因此孩子要承受的压力就更大了。我去过新加坡,他们没有那么多人,因此他们学生的压力就不像这里的学生压力大。在中国,小孩的学习压力很大,所以我们这些父母和老人全部都为孩子忙得团团转。 /201211/209755After 18 years handling rich people#39;s money in Europe, the Middle East and Asia, Didier von Daeniken says he found that the concerns of the wealthy are similar no matter where they are in the world. 迪迪埃#8226;冯#8226;德尼肯(Didier von Daeniken)说,在为欧洲、中东和亚洲地区的富人理财18年之后,他发现不管是哪个地方的富人,关心的事情都是差不多的。 #39;The economic cycle may be different in the regions, and there may be more first-generation wealthy in Asia, but an entrepreneur is still an entrepreneur,#39; said the 48-year-old Asia-Pacific head of Barclays Wealth, the private-banking arm of Barclays PLC, a role he#39;s held since 2007. 冯#8226;德尼肯现年48岁,2007年以来一直担任巴克莱集团(Barclays PLC)旗下私人巴克莱财富(Barclays Wealth)的亚太区负责人。他说,各地区经济周期或许并不一样,或许亚洲地区的富一代更多,但企业家毕竟是企业家。 Barclays is in the midst of a major expansion of its global private-banking business, spending GBP 350 million (US9 million) the past two years on technology and new hires. The company expects the bulk of the growth to come from Asia, where booming economies have minted a new generation of millionaires. 巴克莱正在大力拓展其全球私人业务,过去两年它在技术和新招聘人员方面投入了3.5亿英镑(合5.49亿美元)。该公司预计未来的业务增长主要来自亚洲,因为该地区经济的蓬勃发展已经造就了一代新富。 The regional private-banking business at Barclays has grown steadily, with assets under management in Asia increasing 25% last year, in line with the growth rate of the past five years, Mr. von Daeniken said. While Barclays doesn#39;t separate out the assets by region, he said Asia accounts for approximately 10% of global assets under management, which totaled GBP 176 billion at the end of June. 巴克莱在亚洲地区的私人业务一直在稳健增长。据冯#8226;德尼肯说,去年公司在该地区管理的资产增加了25%,延续了过去五年的增势。虽然巴克莱并不单独列出各地区管理资产的数额,但据冯#8226;德尼肯说,在截至6月底巴克莱管理的1,760亿英镑全球资产当中,亚洲地区约占10%。 But the Asian market has hardly been a panacea for Western private banks. For one, costs are rising as competition for bankers sends salaries skyward. And secondly, Asia is calling for a new business model. In the West, most clients have traditionally paid their private bank a flat fee to manage their assets, providing the bank with steady and assured income. Asian clients prefer to pay by the transaction. 不过,亚洲并不是西方私人银脱困的灵丹妙药。首先,随着人才争夺导致薪资猛增,成本正在增加。其次,在亚洲地区做私人需要一种新商业模式。在西方,多数客户一直是为其私人付一笔固定的管理费,这就给带来了稳定而有保障的收入,而亚洲客户则更喜欢按交易付费。 Mr. von Daeniken, based in Singapore, recently spoke with The Wall Street Journal#39;s Jason Chow about the challenges of the Asian market, why he#39;s bullish on Japan, and why he#39;s willing to shell out when hiring senior bankers. 常驻新加坡的冯#8226;德尼肯前不久接受《华尔街日报》记者Jason Chow专访,谈亚洲市场的挑战,谈他为什么看好日本,为什么不惜重金聘请资深家。 The following interview has been edited. 以下是经过编辑的访谈内容。 WSJ: Where is the opportunity for private banks in Asia? 《华尔街日报》:亚洲私人的机会在哪里? Mr. von Daeniken: As long as you have huge creation of wealth in the major economies, markets will be growing. For us, that means targeting Greater China, Indonesia and India. No big surprise. 冯#8226;德尼肯:只要几个主要经济体大量创造财富,市场就会不断增长。对我们来说,这意味着要瞄准大中华区、印度尼西亚和印度。这没有什么好奇怪的。 Add to that: Japan. It sounds counterintuitive - as everyone will tell you about the lost decades in Japan. But it seems not to be true. Last year, for example, the market grew by some 4.2% - the number of high net-worth individuals in Japan. If you go to Japan and look around, we would all agree there are quite a lot of wealthy people in Japan. You look at their cars, the way they dress, you know there is a lot of money. 另外还要加上日本。这听起来不合常理,因为人人都会跟你讲日本失去的几十年。但实际情况好像不是这样。比如在去年,日本市场(按高净值个人数量计算)就扩大了4.2%左右。如果你到日本四处看看,就会发现日本富人相当之多。看他们开的车,穿的衣,就知道他们相当有钱。 WSJ: Private banks traditionally have charged fees to manage people#39;s portfolios, but wealthy Asians prefer to pay by the transaction. Does your business model have to change for Asia? 《华尔街日报》:过去,私人一直是收取资产管理费,但亚洲富人更愿意按交易付费。你们的商业模式是否需要为亚洲而变? Mr. von Daeniken: I think in Europe, it#39;s changing. It#39;s a reflection of [age], not necessarily geography. Even today, Europe is more transaction-oriented than you think. 冯#8226;德尼肯:我认为就是在欧洲,商业模式也在发生变化。这是对这个时代的一种反映,而不一定是对地理位置的反映。即便是在今天,欧洲也比人们所认为的更加以交易为导向。 Having said that, size matters. You need to have a business, in our opinion, of at least US billion-US billion of assets under management to be profitable in Asia. 另外,规模非常重要。我们认为,要想在亚洲实现盈利,管理的资产至少得有200亿美元到250亿美元。 WSJ: With banks growing aggressively in Asia, how do you keep costs in line, especially when it comes to pay? 《华尔街日报》:随着各个在亚洲大力扩张,你们怎样控制成本,特别是薪酬方面的成本? Mr. von Daeniken: In 2008, we made one of the central tenets of our strategy the quality of the bankers we hire. We call it an inverted pyramid. 冯#8226;德尼肯:2008年,我们把受聘家的素质定为我们战略的核心原则之一。我们称之为倒金字塔结构。 We told [the head office in] London that by end of 2012, 60% of our bankers would be managing directors (15 years or more experience), 30% would be VPs and 10% assistant vice presidents. In 2008, only 17% were directors. 我们跟伦敦总部讲,到2012年年底,董事总经理(15年或以上资历)要占60%,副总裁占30%,助理副总裁占10%。2008年董事总经理才占17%。 This is invariably correlated with cost. But I have a different view: If you want to give clients good advice, experience counts. 这不可避免地要涉及到成本。不过从另一个角度来看,如果你想给予客户优质建议,资历是非常重要的。 It#39;s a statement. We#39;re saying that more than 50% of our bankers are senior bankers. Compare us to our competitors. A majority of them are organized in such a way that more than half of them are juniors who are supposed to support the seniors. We think that business is all wrong. 这是在宣告:我们超过半数的家都是资深业者。把我们拿去跟竞争对手比一比吧。在大多数竞争对手的组织结构中,半数以上都是为资深家打下手的资历较浅者。我们认为这种模式是完全错误的。 WSJ: Everybody is trying to poach each other#39;s bankers. How do you keep yours? 《华尔街日报》:在大家都相互挖角的环境下,你们用什么办法留住人才? Mr. von Daeniken: There are bankers who are outpricing themselves. . .but because we are a small organization, we don#39;t need to hire 120 bankers a year. If in a given year, we#39;ve hired 25 bankers, I#39;m very happy. There is no way you are going to find 150 good bankers in the whole of Asia. 冯#8226;德尼肯:有些家的确开价过高……但由于我们是一家小规模机构,我们不需要一年聘请120位家。如果某一年我们聘用了25位家,我就非常满意了。要在整个亚洲找到150名优秀家,那是不可能的。 WSJ: Many clients in Asia, burned by investments gone bad during the last downturn, are dissatisfied with private banks. What do you do to combat that perception? 《华尔街日报》:亚洲地区很多客户在上次衰退期间因为投资失利而受伤,他们对私人并不满意,你们用什么办法来应对他们的这种认知呢? Mr. von Daeniken: Understanding the client is important. It sounds so basic. 冯#8226;德尼肯:理解客户是很重要的。这听起来是非常基本的东西。 You don#39;t have to have very sophisticated tools to have this discussion about risk. One of the primary responsibilities of the banker is to have again and again that conversation. #39;Are you sure? You know where we are? Do you understand the risk on your portfolio?#39; 谈论风险并不需要利用多么复杂的工具。家的首要职责之一,是一次又一次地问“你确定吗”、“你知道我们说的是怎么一回事吗” 、“你是否了解自己投资组合的风险”。 WSJ: What is the biggest risk to growth? 《华尔街日报》:业务增长面临的最大风险是什么? Mr. von Daeniken: Asian economies performing badly - that#39;s the primary risk. That means our clients will make less money, and so they#39;ll have less to invest. But that#39;s the only one. 冯#8226;德尼肯:亚洲经济表现不佳──这是主要风险,这意味着我们客户的收入将会减少,这样一来他们用于投资的资金也会减少。但也就这样一种风险。 WSJ: What about competitors#39; getting a larger share of the private-banking pie? 《华尔街日报》:你会担心竞争对手在私人这块蛋糕中获得了较大的份额吗? Mr. von Daeniken: I#39;m more concerned that the pie is shrinking. 冯#8226;德尼肯:我更担心的是这块蛋糕变小。 We have grown by expanding our bankers population. Bankers brought with them clients. And that has been a significant contributor to growing our assets. In the next five to six years, it#39;s very important for us to be more and more successful in satisfying our clients. The first phase was for bankers to bring the client network they have. The next phase is for clients to advocate what we have achieved. 通过扩充家的人数,我们实现了扩张。家会带来客户,这成了我们扩充资产规模的重要贡献因素。在接下来五六年里,越来越有效地满足客户需求将是非常重要的。第一阶段是让家把他们的客户人脉带过来。下一阶段是让客户来宣传我们取得的成绩。 /201208/197279武汉如果不割包皮会怎么武汉慢性淋菌性尿道炎治疗

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